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I. INTRODUCTION
Court-annexed arbitration is a form of nonbinding mandatory alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) where parties are required to submit to arbitration
before seeking a trial de novo in a court of law. However, court-annexed arbitration programs often have “penalty provisions,” the purpose of which is to
dissuade litigants from actually seeking a trial de novo.1 Without penalty provisions, litigants would have little incentive to take court-annexed arbitration
programs seriously.2 The problem is that some penalty provisions might go too
far in dissuading litigants, and therefore unconstitutionally impair the right to a
jury trial.3
Legislators or judges designing the rules for court-annexed arbitration
have to walk a tightrope when it comes to penalty provisions.4 A designer
wants the penalty provision to be effective at deterring litigants from automatically appealing arbitration decisions.5 At the same time, the designer must
make sure the penalty provision is not too effective.6 If the penalty provision
goes too far in deterring litigants, it may make the right of a jury trial “practically unavailable” and therefore risk a court finding it unconstitutional.7
Nevada’s court-annexed arbitration program and its unique penalty provisions arguably burden the right to a jury trial more than any other program in
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2011, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las
Vegas. Much thanks to Professor Jean Sternlight, Chris A. Beecroft, Roy Smith, Brianna
Issurdutt, Nicholas Portz, Tenesa S. Scaturro, Joseph Mott, and Derrick Harris.
1 Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional
Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 494-95 (1989).
2 See Amy J. Schmitz, Nonconsensual + Nonbinding = Nonsensical? Reconsidering CourtConnected Arbitration Programs, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 587, 610-11 (2009).
3 In re Smith, 112 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa. 1955).
4 Schmitz, supra note 2, at 589-90 (recognizing balance between effectiveness of penalty
provisions and the right to a jury trial).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA PORTER LOVE, ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, AND
JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 562 (2005)
(quoting In re Smith, 112 A.2d at 629).
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the United States. Nevertheless, litigants, attorneys, and the general public
view Nevada’s ADR programs, including the court-annexed arbitration program,8 as beneficial.9 Popular opinion, however, does not determine a law’s
constitutionality, or even make it a good idea. Because there is no clear demarcation as to how far a program can go,10 it is unresolved whether Nevada has
gone too far in burdening the right to a jury trial.
This Note focuses on Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) § 38.259(2)(a),
passed in 1999, which requires the written findings of an arbitrator be admitted
at a trial de novo.11 NRS § 38.259(2)(a) is a unique penalty provision—no
other court-annexed arbitration program, as of July 2008, requires the findings
of an arbitrator to be admitted at a trial de novo.12 In Zamora v. Price, a
litigant challenged NRS § 38.259(2)(a), arguing it violated his right to a jury
trial because the jury appeared to simply adopt the arbitrator’s findings.13 The
Nevada Supreme Court held that admitting the arbitrator’s written findings
does not violate the right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Nevada Constitution and the United States Constitution.14
Regardless of constitutional concerns, the question remains whether
admitting the written findings of the arbitrator is a good idea. The purpose of a
penalty provision is to reduce the incentive of a litigant to request a trial de
novo.15 By mandating the admission of the arbitrator’s written findings, the
legislature undoubtedly believed that juries would rely, in a significant amount
of matters, on the arbitrator’s decision in making their own findings.16 This
belief appears to be false in virtually all cases.17 Because admitting the arbitrator’s findings is not having the effect the legislature intended, Nevada must
seriously question the policy rationale of continuing the practice.
This Note analyzes NRS § 38.259(2)(a) and the Nevada Supreme’s Court
decision in Zamora to determine the constitutionality and policy implications
of admitting an arbitrator’s findings at a trial de novo. Part II briefly discusses
court-annexed arbitration programs and penalty provisions. Part III summarizes Nevada’s court-annexed arbitration program and the legislative history of
NRS § 38.259(2)(a). Part IV looks at previous constitutional challenges to pen8

Telephone Interview with Chris A. Beecroft Jr., ADR Comm’r, Nev. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court (Dec. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Beecroft Interview].
9 SUPREME COURT OF NEV., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEVADA JUDICIARY 33 (2009), available at http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/viewdocumentsandforms/func-startdown/
2896/; Beecroft Interview, supra note 8; see also Schmitz, supra note 2, at 608 (noting that,
unlike other state programs, Nevada’s Court-Annexed Arbitration program is generally seen
as efficient).
10 MENKEL-MEADOW, LOVE, SCHNEIDER & STERNLIGHT, supra note 7, at 562.
11 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.259(2)(a) (2009).
12 See Schmitz, supra note 2, at 618-25 (comparing court-annexed arbitration programs, or
lack of thereof, for every state).
13 Zamora v. Price, 213 P.3d 490, 493 (Nev. 2009).
14 Id. at 494.
15 Schmitz, supra note 2, at 589-90.
16 Beecroft Interview, supra note 8; see also Hearing on S.B. 315 Before the S. Comm. on
Judiciary, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. 778 (Nev. 1999) [hereinafter S.B. 315 Hearing] (testimony
of Judge Gene T. Porter stating that the purpose of bill was to “put some teeth” into the
arbitration program).
17 Beecroft Interview, supra note 8.
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alty provisions, including two cases on which the Nevada Supreme Court relied
heavily in deciding Zamora. Part V summarizes the Nevada Supreme Court’s
opinion in Zamora. Part VI analyzes the Nevada Supreme Court’s rationale in
finding that admitting the arbitrator’s findings at a trial de novo does not violate
the right to due process or the right to a jury trial. Part VII analyzes the policy
rationale behind admitting the arbitrator’s findings. Part VIII summarizes the
potential costs and benefits of retaining the penalty provision, and contends that
its benefits do not outweigh its potential costs.
II. BACKGROUND
Mandatory court-annexed arbitration programs18 prevent some litigants
from seeking a judicial trial until they have participated in an arbitration program.19 Generally, court-annexed arbitration programs either set a jurisdictional limit dependent on the amount in controversy (e.g., mandating arbitration
for cases where the amount in controversy is less than $50,000) or allow the
court itself to decide whether to mandate arbitration.20 Mandatory ADR programs, such as court-annexed arbitration, raise many constitutional concerns.21
Common constitutional challenges to mandatory ADR programs arise from
rights such as due process and equal protection, as well as from principles such
as separation of powers.22 It is impairment of the right to a jury trial,23 though,
that raises one of the strongest constitutional challenges to mandatory ADR
programs.24
Because of concerns that court-annexed arbitration programs might unduly
burden the right to a jury trial, they are usually nonbinding—either party can
request a trial de novo after arbitration is completed.25 This “trial de novo
escape hatch” has been criticized on policy grounds.26 Some contend it creates
inefficiency because parties do not take the arbitration seriously, knowing they
can simply request a new trial if they are not satisfied with the arbitrator’s
18

Court-annexed arbitration is also often referred to as “nonbinding mandatory arbitration”
or “court-connected arbitration.”
19 L. Christopher Rose, Nevada’s Court-Annexed Mandatory Arbitration Program: A Solution to Some of the Causes of Dissatisfaction with the Civil Justice System, 36 IDAHO L. REV.
171, 172 n.8 (1999).
20 See Schmitz, supra note 2, at 618-25 (comparing mandatory arbitration statutes, or lack
thereof, of all fifty states and various federal districts).
21 See generally Golann, supra note 1.
22 Id. at 493.
23 The United States Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in civil cases: “In Suits
at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VII,. This right has not been extended
to the states through the process of incorporation. James L. “Larry” Wright & M. Matthew
Williams, Remember the Alamo: The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution,
the Doctrine of Incorporation, and State Caps on Jury Awards, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 449, 48283 (2004). However, forty-eight states have a state constitutional provision guaranteeing the
right a jury trial in civil cases. Golann, supra note 1, at 503.
24 Golann, supra note 1, at 502.
25 See Schmitz, supra note 2, at 603-04, 618-25 (comparing mandatory arbitration statutes,
or lack thereof, of all fifty states and various federal districts).
26 See id. at 606.
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findings.27 The availability of this option, some argue, makes court-annexed
arbitration nothing more than “a superfluous but expensive dispute resolution
process.”28 In explaining why court-annexed arbitration might simply add
more costs to the litigation process, Professor Amy J. Schmitz makes an analogy to preseason football:
Court-connected arbitration may thus resemble a bad preseason football game.
The players may go through the motions knowing that the results do not “matter” in
that they do not “bind” the parties on the record. Teams may then waste resources
and suffer needless injuries in the game. They may also keep their best players out of
the fray to save them for the “real thing” to the extent disputants may refrain from
offering their best evidence in arbitration to preserve its effect for the trial de novo
they plan to pursue after the arbitral “preseason” is over. The difference is that football teams usually make money entertaining the public through preseason games,
whereas courts and disputants often lose and waste resources through court-annexed
arbitral labyrinths.29

Still, despite the fact that the “trial de novo escape-hatch” is the subject of
much criticism,30 it might actually be necessary to preserve the rights to a jury
trial and due process under the law, and can provide a means to jettison
“unwarranted arbitration decisions.”31
Legislatures, however, have sought to give teeth to court-annexed arbitration programs by enacting penalty provisions that attempt to dissuade litigants
from actually seeking a trial de novo following arbitration.32 These penalty
provisions might raise constitutional concerns if they are found to be so “onerous” that they make the right to a jury trial “practically unavailable.”33 For
example, Nevada Arbitration Rule (NAR) 20(b) creates a penalty provision that
shifts attorney’s fees and costs to the party requesting a trial de novo if, at the
new trial, the requesting party fails to improve upon the amount they were
awarded at arbitration.34 The state’s most controversial penalty provision
might be that requiring the written findings of the arbitrator be admitted into
evidence if a party requests a trial following arbitration.35
III. NEVADA’S COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION PROGRAM
Nevada requires that cases be submitted to nonbinding arbitration when
the amount in controversy “does not exceed $50,000 per plaintiff, exclusive of
attorney’s fees, interest and court costs.”36 After completing arbitration, either
27

Id. at 611.
Id.
29 Id. at 610.
30 Id. at 606-15.
31 Id. at 606.
32 Golann, supra note 1, at 494-95.
33 In re Smith, 112 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa. 1955).
34 NEV. ARB. R. 20(B)(2)(a)-(b) (2010).
35 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.259(2)(a) (2009).
36 Id. § 38.250(1)(a). However, cases where “the parties have agreed or are otherwise
required to submit the action to an alternative method of resolving disputes established by
the Supreme Court . . . including, without limitation, a settlement conference, mediation or a
short trial” are exempt. Id.
28
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party may exercise its right to a trial de novo37 within thirty days after the
arbitration award is served on the parties.38 Nevada’s court-annexed arbitration
program has multiple penalty provisions, including cost-shifting provisions,39 a
requirement that litigants act in “good faith” during arbitration (or else a
request for a trial de novo may be denied),40 and, the main focus of this Note, a
requirement that the written findings of the arbitrator must be admitted at a new
trial.41
A. Cost-Shifting Provisions and the Requirement of “Good Faith”
Prior to requiring the arbitrator’s written findings to be admitted at a trial
de novo, Nevada’s court-annexed arbitration program had two significant penalty provisions: a cost-shifting provision42 and a requirement that litigants act
in “good faith.”43 NAR 20(b) shifts attorney’s fees and costs to the party
requesting a new trial if that party fails to improve its position by 20 percent
when the arbitration award is $20,000 or less, or by 10 percent if the arbitration
award is greater than $20,000.44
Nevada also requires that litigants act in good faith during arbitration.45 A
party faces waiving its right to a trial de novo if the party fails “to either prosecute or defend a case in good faith during the arbitration proceedings.”46 The
Nevada Supreme Court has been inconsistent in interpreting precisely what
constitutes good faith.47 For example, in Chamberland v. Labarbera, the court
held that a defendant’s failure to conduct any discovery and the failure of the
defendant to appear at the arbitration hearing did not constitute bad faith.48
However, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s decision to deny a
trial de novo when a defendant did not comply with the plaintiff’s discovery
requests.49
37

The rules of mandatory arbitration, as determined by the Nevada Supreme Court, must
include “[p]rovisions for trial upon the exercise by either party of the party’s right to a trial
anew after the arbitration.” Id. § 38.255(4)(d).
38 “Within 30 days after the arbitration award is served upon the parties, any party may file
with the clerk of the court and serve on the other parties and the commissioner a written
request for trial de novo of the action. Any party requesting a trial de novo must certify that
all arbitrator fees and costs for such party have been paid or shall be paid within 30 days.”
NEV. ARB. R. 18(A).
39 NEV. ARB. R. 20(B).
40 NEV. ARB. R. 22(A).
41 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.259(2)(a) (2009); NEV. ARB. R. 20(A).
42 NEV. ARB. R. 20(B)(2)(a)-(b).
43 NEV. ARB. R. 22(A). For an in-depth discussion of Nevada’s good faith requirement see
Rose, supra note 19, at 190-94.
44 NEV. ARB. R. 20(B)(2)(a)-(b).
45 NEV. ARB. R. 22(A).
46 Id.
47 Hearing on S.B. 195 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. 778 (Nev.
1999) [hereinafter S.B. 195 Hearing].
48 Chamberland v. Labarbera, 877 P.2d 523, 525 (Nev. 1994).
49 Casino Properties, Inc. v. Andrews, 911 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Nev. 1996).
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B. Introduction of Arbitrator’s Written Findings at a New Trial
NRS § 38.259(2)(a) grew out of concerns that the cost-shifting penalty
and good faith requirement were not effective deterrents to parties wastefully
requesting trials de novo.50 Thus, the Nevada legislature began to consider
mandating the introduction of the arbitrator’s written findings at trial.51
Although the concept of introducing the results of an ADR proceeding at trial is
not unique,52 Nevada is the only state that does so with a court-annexed arbitration program.53 If a party requests a new trial following mandatory arbitration,
Nevada law requires the written findings of the arbitrator, or panel of arbitrators, to be admitted as evidence at trial.54
While the Nevada legislature debated the provision, supporters contended
that litigants would have to take arbitration seriously if they knew that the arbitrator’s written findings would be introduced at trial.55 However, opponents of
the provision argued that introducing the arbitrator’s findings would “jeopardize and prejudice” the jury.56
1. Legislative History
In 1999, Nevada State Senator Dina Titus introduced and Judge Mark W.
Gibbons requested introduction of two separate bills57 into the Nevada Senate
in order to “[r]equire . . . certain information concerning arbitration to be
presented at trial de novo before [the] jury.”58 Those who testified in favor of
admitting the arbitrator’s written findings expressed two main concerns about
the nonbinding arbitration program: (1) litigants were not taking arbitration
seriously,59 and (2) some insurance firms were requesting new trials excessively, some even doing so “for no apparent reason, including the smallest of
cases.”60
Regarding the first concern, Judge Mark W. Gibbons from the Eighth
Judicial District testified before the Nevada Senate Committee on Judiciary
(Committee on Judiciary), expressing concerns similar to those in Professor
Schmitz’s preseason football analogy.61 “[O]ver the years,” he testified, “many
people have not taken the arbitration process seriously, and have the intent to
participate minimally, knowing they can request a trial de novo and start over
50

See S.B. 315 Hearing, supra note 16, at 776.
S.B. 315, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. (Nev. 1999); S.B. 195, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. (Nev.
1999).
52 See Golann, supra note 1, at 513-15.
53 See Schmitz, supra note 2, at 618-25 (comparing mandatory arbitration statutes, or lack
thereof, of all fifty states and various federal districts).
54 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.259(2)(a) (2009).
55 S.B. 195 Hearing, supra note 47, at 778.
56 Id. at 783-84.
57 The two bills were designated S.B. 195 and S.B. 315. S. B. 315 Hearing, at 776, 777.
Both bills were virtually identical. Id. at 777. The Nevada Senate eventually passed legislation under S.B. 315.
58 S.B. 315 Hearing, supra note 16, at 776.
59 Id.
60 S.B. 195 Hearing, supra note 47, at 780.
61 S.B. 315 Hearing, supra note 16, at 776; Schmitz, supra note 2, at 610.
51
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again at the time of trial.”62 Accordingly, proponents of the bill argued that
allowing the arbitrator’s written findings to be admitted at trial would be “a
mechanism to ‘put some teeth’ into the arbitration system.”63
George Bochanis, a Las Vegas personal injury attorney, testified he was
concerned that insurance companies request new trials indiscriminately.64
Steve Burris, representing the Nevada Trial Lawyers’ Association, hypothesized that insurance companies are incentivized to request new trials because it
extends the length of the litigation.65 The insurance companies, having the
resources to withstand a lengthy litigation process, request new trials following
arbitration and wait, hoping the plaintiff, often needing the money immediately,
will eventually be willing to settle for less than the arbitration award.66
Opponents to the bill countered that admitting the arbitrator’s written findings at trial would “prejudice” the jury,67 and also would make the arbitration
process more costly.68 Some lobbyists argued that admitting the arbitrator’s
written findings directly conflicted with the definition of a trial de novo and the
findings would unfairly bias the jury.69 Interestingly, the First, Second, and
Ninth Nevada Judicial District Courts were opposed to the legislation because
of concerns that litigants would take arbitration too seriously, which would
drive up the costs of arbitration.70 The Arbitration Commissioner of the Second Judicial District71 testified his Judicial District was not experiencing the
same problems as the Eighth Judicial District—less than 1 percent of arbitration cases in the Second Judicial District resulted in a trial de novo.72 He also
noted that arbitration reduces costs by eliminating discovery and motion practice.73 The commissioner testified, “[A]s the importance of [an] arbitration
decision is increased, the time, effort, energy, and money that both sides pour
into the arbitration will increase as well.”74
2. Statutory Scheme
To understand how the introduction of the arbitrator’s award might affect
the decision of the jury, it is important to understand the process by which the
award is presented. Pursuant to NRS § 38.259, an arbitrator must make written
findings after the conclusion of mandatory nonbinding arbitration in the following form:
Based upon the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing concerning the
cause of action for ................, the arbitrator finds in favor of ................(name of the
62

S.B. 315 Hearing, supra note 16, at 776.
S.B. 195 Hearing, supra note 47, at 778.
64 Id. at 782.
65 Id. at 780, 782.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 776, 784.
68 Id. at 786.
69 Id. at 783-84, 789-90.
70 Id. at 784-86.
71 The Second Judicial District Arbitration Commissioner also represented the Arbitration
Commissioners of the First and Ninth Judicial Districts. Id. at 784.
72 Id. at 784-85.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 785.
63
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party) and ................(“awards damages in the amount of $................” or “does not
award any damages on that cause of action”).75

These written findings must be admitted at trial if either party seeks a trial de
novo.76
As noted above, the legislature was aware of the potential constitutional
challenges based on the right to jury a trial.77 Likely for the purpose of balancing these constitutional concerns, the Nevada legislature enacted a mandatory
jury instruction,78 barred the arbitrator from testifying or being deposed, and
barred any other evidence concerning the arbitration.79 The jury instruction
explains to the jury how to weigh the arbitrator’s written findings as evidence.80 The jury instruction takes the following form:
During the course of this trial, certain evidence was admitted concerning the
findings of an arbitrator. On the cause of action for ................, the arbitrator found in
favor of ................(name of the party) and ................(“awarded damages in the
amount of $................” or “did not award any damages on that cause of action”). The
findings of the arbitrator may be given the same weight as other evidence or may be
disregarded. However, you must not give those findings undue weight because they
were made by an arbitrator, and you must not use the findings of the arbitrator as a
substitute for your independent judgment. You must weigh all the evidence that was
presented at trial and arrive at a conclusion based upon your own determination of
the cause of action.81

IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF

“PENALTY PROVISIONS”

The introduction of the arbitrator’s written findings creates constitutional
concerns because the likely purpose of admitting the findings is to deter litigants from seeking trials de novo.82 However, juxtaposed with the need for
giving court-annexed arbitration some teeth is the constitutional right to a jury
trial. The concern is that by admitting the findings of the arbitrator, the jury
will simply reaffirm the result of the arbitration, and thus take away the factfinding duty of the jury. Litigants have challenged penalty provisions of nonbinding mandatory arbitration programs primarily because they violate the constitutional rights to a jury trial, equal protection, and due process.83 However,
most constitutional attacks on nonbinding mandatory arbitration have failed.84
This Note focuses on the right to a jury trial.
75

NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.259(1) (2009).
Id. § 38.259(2)(a).
77 See S.B. 195 Hearing, supra note 47, at 782-83.
78 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.259(2)(b) (2009).
79 Id. § 38.259(2)(a).
80 Id. § 38.259(2)(b).
81 Id.
82 Beecroft Interview, supra note 8; see also S.B. 195 Hearing, supra note 47, at 778 (testimony of Judge Gene T. Porter stating that the purpose of bill was to “put some teeth” into
the arbitration program).
83 MENKEL-MEADOW, LOVE, SCHNEIDER & STERNLIGHT, supra note 7, at 562.
84 Id.
76
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A. Right to a Civil Jury Trial
Historically, American society has placed great importance on the right to
a jury trial in civil cases.85 The rationale is based on the idea that it represents
a “great safeguard against state power . . . ‘[I]t is the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot be affected either
in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of
twelve of his neighbors and equals.’”86 The United States Constitution preserves the right to a jury trial in civil trials,87 but the right has not been applied
to the states through the process of selective incorporation.88 However, fortyeight of the fifty states, including Nevada, guarantee the right to a jury trial in
their state constitutions.89 Nevada’s constitution reads that “[t]he right of trial
by Jury shall be secured to all and remain inviolate forever.”90
The trial de novo escape hatch has been interpreted as necessary for a
court-annexed arbitration to survive constitutional muster because litigants
must have some “sufficiently unfettered access to a trial de novo.”91 Constitutional analysis, though, does not begin and end with the mere right to a jury
trial.
A penalty provision, or a combination of multiple penalty provisions, may
overly burden the right to obtain a trial de novo and thus violate the right to a
civil jury trial. It is not certain, however, to what degree a penalty provision or
combination of multiple penalty provisions can burden the right to a jury trial
before it will make it practically unavailable.92 Commentators have noted there
is simply no clear line of demarcation.93 In fact, most constitutional challenges
to court-annexed arbitration based upon the right to a jury trial have failed.94
In attempts to determine the limits, commentators95 and the Nevada
Supreme Court96 have looked to particular language from In re Smith, a Pennsylvania case.97 There, the court held that a mandatory arbitration program did
not compromise the right to a jury trial where litigants were required to pay a
$25 fee and the cost of the arbitrator, before either litigant could seek a trial de
novo.98 In reaching this conclusion, the court first held that nonbinding arbitration does not directly interfere with the right to a jury trial because such programs are not a final determination of the parties’ rights.99 However, the court
85

See Wright & Williams, supra note 23, at 496-99.
Id. at 499 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
379 (1765)).
87 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
88 Wright & Williams, supra note 23, at 482-83.
89 Golann, supra note 1, at 503.
90 NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
91 MENKEL-MEADOW, LOVE, SCHNEIDER & STERNLIGHT, supra note 7, at 562 (emphasis
added).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Barrett v. Baird, 908 P.2d 689, 694 (Nev. 1995).
97 In re Smith, 112 A.2d 625 (Pa. 1955).
98 Id. at 628, 631.
99 Id. at 629.
86
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recognized that penalty provisions could significantly interfere with a party’s
right to a jury trial.100 The court held that “the right of appeal for the purpose
of presenting the issue to a jury must not be burdened by the imposition of
onerous conditions, restrictions or regulations which would make the right
practically unavailable.”101 Still, determining whether the right of appeal is
burdened so much that it is practically unavailable is a problem “of degree
rather than of kind.”102
The Smith court rationalized that in certain situations a fee could overly
burden the right of appeal.103 For example, suppose a court-annexed arbitration program required litigants to pay an arbitrator $250 to conduct the arbitration as a prerequisite to a trial de novo. In case X, the amount in controversy is
$50,000. In case Y, the amount in controversy is $1,000. In case X, the $250
fee is relatively meager, less than 1 percent of the amount in controversy. It is
unlikely that a litigant in case X would be significantly deterred from seeking a
trial de novo because of the $250 fee. However, in case Y the fee is relatively
substantial. It is 25 percent of the total amount in controversy. In case Y, it is
likely that a party would not exercise the right to a jury trial because the
amount of the fee would seriously undercut any improvement the party might
gain at a trial de novo.
Acknowledging this issue, the Smith court reasoned that courts would
likely have to waive or lower the arbitrator’s fee in case Y, or else the fee
would unconstitutionally burden the right to a jury trial.104 Because a court
must analyze the burden on the right to a jury trial in the context of other
circumstances, making a bright-line rule is virtually impossible.
V. ZAMORA V. PRICE
In Zamora v. Price, the Nevada Supreme Court held the admission of the
arbitrator’s written findings at a trial de novo, pursuant to NRS § 38.259, does
not violate the constitutional right to jury trial.105 The court reasoned that the
arbitrator’s written findings were “mere evidence” the jury could accept or
reject.106 The court placed great weight on the statutory jury instruction, NRS
§ 38.259(2)(b), finding the instruction sufficiently addresses any concern that
introducing the arbitrator’s written findings interferes with the right to a jury
trial.107
In 2004, Tyshae Price filed a complaint in Nevada’s Eighth Judicial District Court against Steve Zamora asserting tort claims resulting from an automobile accident.108 The court submitted the case to mandatory non-binding
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
Zamora v. Price, 213 P.3d 490, 494 (Nev. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 491.
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arbitration because the amount in controversy was less than $40,000.109 After
conducting a hearing, the arbitrator awarded Price $18,000 in damages.110
Zamora requested a trial de novo, resulting in a jury trial.111 In accordance with Nevada law, the arbitrator’s findings were admitted into trial as
evidence.112 The jury awarded Price $18,000, the same amount she received
via arbitration.113 Zamora appealed the verdict to the Nevada Supreme Court
on the grounds that his constitutional right to a jury trial and his right to equal
protection of the law had been violated by the introduction of the arbitrator’s
written findings into evidence.114 The Nevada Supreme Court found the
admission of the arbitrator’s findings did not violate Zamora’s right to a jury
trial because the findings are “mere evidence” for the jury to weigh.115 The
court also rejected Zamora’s equal protection claims, finding a rational basis
for only applying nonbinding mandatory arbitration where the amount in controversy is less than a certain amount.116 This Note focuses only on Zamora’s
claim that his right to a jury trial was violated.
A. Right to a Jury Trial
Zamora based his argument on the idea that admission of the arbitrator’s
written findings violated his constitutional right to a jury trial “because it effectively removed the jury as the fact-finder . . . and improperly turned the jury
into an appellate body reviewing the reasonableness of the arbitration
award.”117 Zamora also argued that the entire purpose of admitting the written
findings is to prejudice the party requesting a trial de novo, “which defeats the
very purpose of having a new trial.”118 To prove his point, Zamora pointed to
the fact that the jury awarded Price the exact amount that the arbitrator
awarded.119
The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Zamora’s argument.120 In analyzing
Zamora’s right to a jury trial claim, the court relied heavily on its decision in
Barrett v. Baird,121 where the court held that the admission of a medical-legal
screening panel’s findings at trial did not violate the right to a jury trial.122
In Barrett, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the admission of the written findings of a medical-legal screening panel did not burden the litigant’s
109 The complaint was filed on January 15, 2004, at which time it was required all civil
actions where the amount in controversy did not exceed $40,000 to be submitted to nonbinding arbitration. Id. at n.1. In 2005, the amount in controversy was increased to $50,000.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.250(1)(a) (2009).
110 Zamora, 213 P.3d at 491.
111 Id. at 491-92.
112 Id. at 493.
113 Id. at 492.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 494.
116 Id. at 495-96.
117 Id. at 493.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 494.
121 Barrett v. Baird, 908 P.2d 689 (Nev. 1995).
122 Zamora, 213 P.3d at 493-95.
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right to a jury trial to such a degree that it was practically unavailable.123
Nevada law required plaintiffs to submit a petition alleging medical malpractice
to a medical-legal screening panel prior to filing a complaint in district court.124
The medical-legal screening panel found no negligence on the part of the
defendant.125 The plaintiff proceeded with a complaint and the panel’s findings were admitted at trial.126 At trial, the jury found no negligence on the part
of the defendant, and the plaintiff received no damages.127
Barrett argued that the screening panel statute denied her right to a jury
trial because jurors were predisposed to “overvalue the weight of the panel’s
decision without knowing that the panel’s decision relies on evidence that
would be inadmissible at trial.”128 The court ruled that the admission of the
panel’s findings was mere evidence that the jury, according to the mandatory
jury instruction, is to weigh as “‘an expert opinion which is to be evaluated by
the jury in the same manner as it would evaluate any other expert opinion.’”129
In deciding the sufficiency of the jury instruction the Barrett court looked to a
Ninth Circuit case, Wray v. Gregory.130
In Wray, the Ninth Circuit found that the written findings of a medicallegal screening panel (the same panel procedure analyzed in Barrett) were
improperly admitted at trial because of a statutory technicality.131 In dicta, the
Ninth Circuit expressed skepticism that the jury instruction, as it was written at
the time, constitutionally ensured the right to a jury trial.132 At the time, the
jury instruction merely stated that the jury must treat the screening panel’s findings as it would treat “any other evidence.”133 The Ninth Circuit held the
screening panel’s findings were not like “any other evidence” because the findings purported to be a final determination of the central issue (i.e., whether
there was medical malpractice), by experts that were not subject to crossexamination.134
The Ninth Circuit also suggested that Nevada judges should bolster the
jury instruction so the jury does not give undue weight to the panel’s findings.135 Specifically, they advised judges to inform juries that “because the
screening panel inquiry constitutes only ‘a summary process’ and because
Nevada law precludes the jury from inquiring into that process, the jurors
123

Barrett, 908 P.2d at 694.
See id. at 692.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 694.
129 Id. (quoting Comiskey v. Arlen, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)). In
Barrett, the court also instructed the jury that the panel’s finding “is a summary process to
screen those frivolous and marginal cases. It is not a full trial and is not to be considered by
you as a substitute for a full trial.” Id. at n.5. This additional instruction appears to follow
the suggestion of the Ninth Circuit. Wray v. Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414, 1419 (9th Cir. 1995).
130 Wray, 61 F.3d at 1414.
131 Id. at 1420.
132 Id. at 1419.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See id.
124
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should not give undue weight to the panel’s findings.”136 The Ninth Circuit
stated that a jury instruction needed to ensure that the introduction of the
panel’s findings do not “interpose [an] obstacle to a full contestation of all the
issues, and take [a] question of fact from . . . the jury.”137 The Ninth Circuit’s
concern was that a jury would take the panel screenings and adopt them as their
own.138
The Barrett court looked at the dicta in Wray to support its conclusion that
the admission of a medical-legal screening panel at trial violates neither the
United States constitutional right to due process nor the Nevada constitutional
right to a jury trial.139 Essentially, the jury instructions had been amended in
accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s suggestions in Wray.140 The Zamora court
analogized the admission of an arbitrator’s written findings to the admission of
a medical screening panel analyzed in Barrett.141
The Zamora court held that the award, like the panel’s findings in Barrett,
“is mere evidence, which the jury is free to accept or reject.”142 The court also
reasoned that a party could attack the arbitrator’s findings;143 if a party is not
satisfied with the arbitration result, the party has the opportunity to present
evidence and argue that the arbitrator decided the case incorrectly.144 Because
the arbitrator’s findings are mere evidence, it is the party’s job to present evidence and convince the jury that the arbitrator’s decision was wrong.145
Zamora argued that admission of the arbitrator’s written findings was different from the admission of the screening panel’s determination of negligence
in Barrett because the arbitrator’s findings are not similar to expert testimony.146 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that “[r]egardless of
whether the award is or is not considered expert testimony, the award is nonetheless evidence that the Legislature, by enacting the substantive rule of evidence . . . has authorized for admission at the trial de novo.”147 The court also
reasoned that the mandatory jury instruction addressed concerns that the admission of the findings would impair the jury’s “fact-finding role.”148
VI. INTRODUCING

ARBITRATOR’S FINDINGS AT A TRIAL DE NOVO
VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

THE

NOT

DOES

In Zamora, the court held that the introduction of an arbitrator’s written
findings in a trial de novo does not unconstitutionally burden the right to a jury
136

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Jain v. McFarland, 851 P.2d 450, 455 (Nev. 1993)).
Id. at 1419 (alteration in original) (quoting Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 236 U.S.
412, 430 (1915)).
138 See id.
139 Barrett v. Baird, 908 P.2d 689, 695 (Nev. 1995).
140 Id.
141 Zamora v. Price, 213 P.3d 490, 494 (Nev. 2009).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
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trial nor does it violate a litigant’s right to equal protection of the law.149 The
court’s dismissal of Zamora’s equal protection claim appears to be supported
by all authorities on the subject. However, the court’s decision as it relates to
the right to a jury trial is worthy of in-depth analysis.
Although other ADR programs have had similar penalty provisions
allowing the admittance of the findings of the ADR program at a trial de
novo,150 Nevada is only the state with a court-annexed mandatory arbitration
program that allows arbitrators’ findings to be admitted at a trial de novo.151
Despite the apparent validity of the belief that the jury will not give undue
weight to the arbitrator’s findings,152 there are some issues worthy of consideration. First, Zamora’s argument that there is a difference between a medicallegal screening panel and an arbitrator’s findings could have more merit if
argued differently. Second, when the moderator of an ADR program (such as
arbitration) is not available for cross-examination, as is the case with Nevada’s
court-annexed arbitration program,153 it might violate the right to a jury trial.154
Finally, the belief that the jury instruction is adequate to protect against overreliance on the arbitrator’s findings might be flawed.
A. Differences Between a Medical-Legal Screening Panel and an
Arbitrator’s Findings
One of Zamora’s arguments—which the court dismissed as unpersuasive—is that an arbitrator, unlike a medical-legal screening panel, is not an
expert.155 Although it might be immaterial whether an arbitrator is an expert,
the fact remains that an arbitrator is different from a medical-legal screening
panel. The goal of the screening panel is to look at cases of medical malpractice and decide whether they have merit.156 Regardless of the panel’s decision,
a litigant is allowed to move forward with a malpractice lawsuit.157 An arbitrator, however, examines evidence, decides fault, and awards damages accordingly. Unlike the screening panel, arbitration is not a “summary process.”158
Part of the reasoning of the Nevada Supreme Court in Barrett 159 and the
Ninth Circuit in Wray 160 was that the jury would be able to determine that the
panel’s decision was merely a “summary process” to which they should not
give “undue weight.” One could argue that if the jury knew that the arbitrator,
who is often a lawyer,161 functioned as the fact-finder, they would give more
149

Id. at 494, 496.
See Golann, supra note 1, at 513-15.
151 See Schmitz, supra note 2, at 618-25 (comparing mandatory arbitration statutes, or lack
thereof, of all fifty states and various federal districts).
152 Beecroft Interview, supra note 8.
153 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.259(2)(a) (2009).
154 Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343, 360-61 (Alaska 1988) (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
155 Zamora v. Price, 213 P.3d 490, 494 (Nev. 2009).
156 See Barrett v. Baird, 908 P.2d 689, 692 (Nev. 1995).
157 Id. at 695.
158 See id. (describing the Medical-Legal Screening Panel as a “summary process”).
159 Id.
160 Wray v. Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414, 1419 (9th Cir. 1995).
161 Beecroft Interview, supra note 8.
150
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weight to an arbitrator than they would a screening panel. In fact, it appears
that attorneys who represent clients in Nevada’s court-annexed arbitration program believe this to be true. When an attorney represents a client in courtannexed arbitration and wins, and the other party requests a trial de novo, the
winning attorney often tries to introduce evidence as to how the arbitration
process works.162 However, they are almost always unsuccessful in actually
getting such evidence admitted.163 Knowing this, why would an attorney nevertheless try to introduce this evidence? The answer is likely because if the
jury knew how arbitration worked, it would give the arbitrator’s findings much
more weight in its own decision.164
Also, a jury member could already know how arbitration works or could
infer its nature from the written findings alone. Although it is unlikely that a
jury member would know of Nevada’s court-annexed arbitration program specifically, it is possible a jury member will know of the process of arbitration in
general. A jury member could also infer that arbitration was similar to a trial
based upon the arbitrator’s award. The written findings state they are “based
upon the evidence presented.”165 The findings then declare whether or not
fault is found, and the amount of damages awarded, if any.166 It is unlikely a
jury member would conclude that the arbitration process is some sort of summary process; the only evidence the jury is given about the arbitration process
looks like a court order proclaiming to be based on evidence by the litigants,
similar to a trial order.
B. The Unavailability of the Arbitrator to be Cross-Examined
One also could argue that not allowing cross-examination of the arbitrator
violates a litigant’s right to a jury trial because there is a danger the jury will
give too much weight to the findings without any opportunity for rebuttal.167
The Nevada Supreme Court did not address this issue in Zamora, but the
Alaska Supreme Court rejected a similar argument.168 In Keyes v. Humana
Hospital Alaska, Inc., the Alaska Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality
of admitting medical malpractice screening panel opinions at trial and rejected
the plaintiff’s argument that not allowing him to cross-examine the panel members violated his right to a jury trial.169 The Keyes court relied on the fact that
the plaintiff had access to the records and statements made to the panel, which
either party could use to buttress or impeach the panel’s opinion.170
Cross-examination is very important to how a jury perceives the credibility of a witness.171 For example, if Zamora had the opportunity to cross162

Id.
Id.
164 Id.
165 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.259(1) (2009).
166 Id.
167 Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska Inc., 750 P.2d 343, 360-61 (Alaska 1988) (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
168 Id. at 349 (majority opinion).
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See id.
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examine the arbitrator, he might have been able to show the arbitrator made his
or her decision based on faulty principles of law, personal bias, or shaky reasoning. Because the issue has not been settled, a party could challenge NRS
§ 38.259(2)(b) on the ground that not allowing litigants to cross-examine the
arbitrator violates their right to a jury trial.172
C. Analysis of the Jury Instruction
The Zamora court believed the jury instruction strongly safeguarded
against concerns that the jury would rely too heavily on the arbitrator’s findings.173 Indeed, the holding that an arbitrator’s written findings are “mere evidence that the jury can accept or reject”174 has statistical support: juries rarely
give the findings any deference at all.175
The problem with the court’s analysis of the jury instruction, however, is
that it did not take into account any statistical evidence. If evidence showed
that juries gave significant deference to the arbitrator’s findings in the majority
of cases, the right to a jury trial would be significantly impaired, regardless of
the jury instruction. Suppose that in eighty percent of cases, the jury simply
adopted the arbitrator’s findings, or something relatively close. If a litigant had
only a twenty percent chance to alter the outcome of the arbitration, there
would be very little incentive to appeal. Arguably, the right of appeal would be
“practically unavailable” in such a scenario.
The ADR Commissioner for Nevada’s Eighth Judicial District Court
believes that jury members generally take their fact-finding role seriously.176
Polling conducted by the Eighth Judicial District Court found that jury members do not substitute their own judgment with that of the arbitrators.177 One
could also contend that the jury simply would not care about the written findings of the arbitrator even if there were not a limiting instruction. Perhaps the
jury trusts no judgment but its own, and the trial format provides jurors with
more than enough information to come to a conclusion.
In summary, it appears that introducing the arbitrator’s written findings at
a trial de novo does not violate the right to a jury trial.178 Although there are
many arguments that could be levied against the introduction of the findings,
juries appear take their role as fact-finders seriously.179 The evidence shows
that the introduction of the arbitrator’s findings does not have a significant
impact on juries.180 Ironically, the fact that juries do not give much weight to
the introduction of the arbitrator’s written findings helps bolster the constitu172 See id. at 360-61; cf. McLaughlin v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. Rptr. 479, 483 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (finding admittance of mediator’s recommendations at trial violated right to due
process where party was not allowed to cross-examine mediator).
173 Zamora v. Price, 213 P.3d 490, 494 (Nev. 2009).
174 Id.
175 Beecroft Interview, supra note 8. Beecroft estimated that 98 to 99 percent of juries do
not adopt the arbitrator’s findings. Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.

298

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:282

tionality of the practice and at the same time damages the policy rationale
behind it.
VII. WHY KEEP

A

PENALTY PROVISION

THAT

CREATES NO PENALTY?

Even if admitting the written findings of the arbitrator is constitutional, is
it a good idea? The Nevada legislature believed that mandating the admission
of the arbitrator’s written findings would “put some teeth” into Nevada’s courtannexed arbitration program.181 The legislature likely believed litigants would
be less likely to request a trial de novo because they thought juries would be
strongly influenced by the arbitrator’s written findings.182 The reality, however, is that juries very rarely give the arbitrator’s findings much weight at
all;183 the identical award in Zamora is a statistical anomaly.184 But this discrepancy between the intended penalty and the actual outcome warrants serious
consideration of the potential benefits and drawbacks of continuing the practice. Ultimately, the drawbacks appear to outweigh the benefits.
A. Potential Benefits of Introducing the Arbitrator’s Findings
One cannot say admitting the arbitrator’s findings is a bad policy simply
because the jury rarely adopts the same award as the arbitrator. There are some
arguments that the findings should be admitted notwithstanding the effects on
juries. One is that litigants might believe that introducing the arbitrator’s written findings has at least some effect on the jury. Another is that introduction of
the arbitrator’s written findings at a trial de novo could be used as a bargaining
chip in settlement talks.
1. Litigants Might Believe the Findings Influence the Jury
Litigants might believe that a negative result at arbitration can only hurt
their cases in the view of the jury. If that is the case, the litigant has an incentive to take the arbitration seriously. Even though juries do not follow the
arbitrator’s award most of the time, a litigant could still see it as a loss that
could hurt them later at trial. Thus, there is potential that admitting the arbitrator’s findings at trial will give a negative reinforcement for litigants to arbitrate
seriously.
Conversely, litigants might also believe a positive result at arbitration can
only help their cases. They may believe that winning an arbitration is simply
another brick in the wall of evidence supporting their cases at trial, and thus
take the arbitration seriously. Even if the jury does not adopt the findings of
the arbitrator, it is possible the jury is still influenced by the arbitration award
in some manner. The effect might be slight, but constructing a case is often
like constructing a building. One usually constructs a case using little bricks of
181

S.B. 195 Hearing, supra note 47, at 778.
Beecroft Interview, supra note 8; see also S.B. 315 Hearing, supra note 16, at 776
(testimony of Judge Gene T. Porter stating that the purpose of bill was to “put some teeth”
into the arbitration program).
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evidence supporting one another, not one giant rock. A positive result at arbitration can be seen as a little brick helping to build the litigant’s case.
2. Admittance of Findings Might Influence Settlement Negotiations
Many court-annexed arbitration cases are appealed to a trial de novo, but
80 to 85 percent of the cases settle before a new trial occurs.185 Litigants must
weigh the effect of admission of the arbitrator’s findings during post-arbitration
settlement negotiations. A litigant who received a positive result at arbitration
could utilize the fact that the findings will be admitted at trial to increase his or
her bargaining position. On the contrary, the losing litigant might fear that the
jury will follow the arbitrator’s findings, thus reducing that party’s chances for
success at a trial de novo. Misconceived or not, such assumptions about who
has the upper hand could inspire both parties to end the case quickly rather than
face the additional time, costs, and risk of a trial de novo.
However, it is more likely that attorneys already know that juries rarely
follow the arbitrator’s written findings.186 Accordingly, it is unlikely attorneys
conducting negotiations for their clients could use a victory in arbitration to
gain a better negotiating position.
B. Potential Drawbacks to Introducing the Arbitrators Findings
One of the big drawbacks to admitting the arbitrator’s findings is that losing parties might have an incentive to appeal to a trial de novo because juries
rarely match the arbitrator’s award. Another drawback is that if courts view
admitting the arbitrator’s findings as a penalty provision, regardless of its effectiveness as a deterrent, it might move a court-annexed arbitration program one
step closer to violating the constitutional right to a jury trial. This is of great
significance when the penalty provision is not effective at deterring parties
from seeking a trial de novo.
1. Admission of Arbitrator’s Findings Might Incentivize Requests for
Trials De Novo
Because juries most often do not follow the arbitrator’s outcome, it arguably gives an incentive for losing litigants to appeal to a trial de novo. Suppose
a plaintiff is awarded $50,000 at arbitration. Also, suppose the defendant, for
whatever reason, strongly believes the jury will not award more than $50,000.
Recall that the defendant will have to pay the plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs
if the defendant fails to improve its position by 10 percent.187 In this case, the
defendant will be responsible for the plaintiff’s attorney fees unless the jury
reduces the award to $45,000 or less. If the defendant, armed with the knowledge that juries rarely award the same amount as the arbitrator, strongly
believes that the jury will award less, the defendant will have a greater incentive to appeal the decision. Although knowing that the jury rarely awards the
same amount as the arbitrator acts as an incentive in this scenario, where the
185
186
187
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defendant has a strong belief the jury will award less, in virtually all cases there
is no logical reason for such a strong belief.
2. One More Step toward “Practically Unavailable”
There is no bright-line rule to determine when penalty provisions go too
far and unconstitutionally restrict the right to a jury trial.188 One can view
penalty provisions as obstacles and the right to a jury trial as a path. Every
penalty provision a litigant faces in appealing an adverse arbitration finding
places an obstacle in the path to a trial de novo. The more penalty provisions
there are, the more obstacles there are in the path.
However, one needs to take into account the strength of the penalty provisions, as well. In theory, one strong penalty provision could be more severe
than many weak ones. At some point, if there are too many obstacles in the
path, or if there are a few obstacles that are too severe, a court may invalidate a
court-annexed arbitration program as onerously burdening the right to a jury
trial to the degree that it is practically unavailable. Every obstacle added moves
a court-annexed arbitration program closer to crossing the line of making the
right to a jury trial “practically unavailable.”189
If a penalty provision does not have the desired consequence intended, it
should be seriously questioned. It should be questioned if, for no other reason,
to provide more room for penalty provisions that actually work. Penalty provisions that are not effective simply increase the risk a court might find a courtannexed arbitration program unconstitutional without adding any significant
benefits. A penalty provision that does not work could be replaced with one
that does. Or, a penalty provision that does not work could be removed and
existing penalty provisions that do work could be strengthened.
C. The Potential Drawbacks Outweigh the Benefits
The potential drawbacks of continuing to admit the arbitrator’s written
findings at a trial de novo outweigh the potential advantages. Although litigants could theoretically use the admission of the findings to increase their
bargaining position in settlement talks, such use is not likely. In reality, the
admittance of the findings could actually incentivize litigants to request trials
de novo, despite the fact that the arbitrators’ findings are of little consequence
to juries. Instead of having a nonworking penalty provision count as a strike
against a successful court-annexed arbitration program’s constitutionality, other
deterrents could be implemented or existing deterrents bolstered.
When the Nevada legislature mandated that arbitrators’ written findings be
admitted at trials de novo, it likely believed that juries would often give deference to the findings.190 They do not. Although it is possible that admitting the
arbitrator’s findings deters litigants from seeking a trial de novo for other reasons, it is very unlikely. Attorneys have likely caught on that juries are not
simply copying the arbitrator’s findings. Thus, courts might view admitting the
188
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arbitrator’s findings as an obstacle in a constitutionality analysis, but, in reality,
litigants are likely undeterred by it. Under such circumstances, the rationale for
continuing to admit the arbitrator’s findings must be seriously re-examined.
Accordingly, the Nevada legislature should repeal NRS § 38.359, and then
either add another penalty provision or bolster its current penalty provisions, as
part of an exchange whereby they take one obstacle off the path and add or
bolster another. For example, the legislature could remove NRS § 38.259 and
strengthen either the good-faith requirement or increase the percentage a litigant must improve by at trial (lest face paying the opposing party’s attorney’s
fees and costs).
VIII. CONCLUSION
Nevada’s court-annexed arbitration program appears successful regardless
of the effect that arbitrators’ written findings have on juries at trials de novo.191
Nevada’s practice of admitting the arbitrator’s findings at a trial de novo does
not violate the right to a jury trial, but the policy rationale for doing so should
be seriously questioned. A successful court-annexed arbitration program, like
Nevada’s program, is rare,192 but the program could be even better through
more effective penalty provisions. Instead of expending efforts on a penalty
provision that does not work, the Nevada legislature should repeal NRS
§ 38.259, which allows the arbitrator’s written findings to be admitted at a trial
de novo, and should either create a new penalty provision or strengthen existing
penalty provisions.

191 Beecroft Interview, supra note 8; see also Schmitz, supra note 2, at 608 (noting that,
unlike other state programs, Nevada’s Court-Annexed Arbitration program is generally seen
as efficient).
192 Beecroft Interview, supra note 8; see also Schmitz, supra note 2, at 606-08 (noting that
the “trial de novo escape hatch” makes nearly all court-annexed aribitration programs inefficient, but excepting Nevada and North Carolina’s programs).

